Haspelmath's paper offers a potentially fruitful synthesis of ideas from functionalist theories of language and optimality theory, a recent but popular formal model for phonology and syntax. As such, Haspelmath's paper is more productive than the all too common out-of-hand dismissal or ignoring of the opposite theoretical camp on both sides of the theoretical divide.
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The opportunity for the synthesis of formalist and functionalist ideas has been created by optimality theory. Optimality theory uses the general idea of competing principles ("constraints") determining linguistic phenomena. Not all the principles can be satisfied at once for any particular phonological sequence (e. g. word + inflection) or syntactic construction. Hence, every possible output is at most partially motivated by the principles underlying language. Partial motivation of linguistic forms as a result of competing motivations is one of the chief theoretical constructs of most functionalist approaches to language, as Haspelmath notes in his paper.
What is most interesting about Haspelmath's paper is his argument that optimality theory and functional competing motivation models share more than the abstract concept of competing motivations. Haspelmath argues that the substantive principles proposed by optimality theorists, at least the ones most widely invoked and assumed to be universal across languages, are in fact identical to the substantive principles proposed by functionalist linguists. I believe that on the whole, Haspelmath is correct in this observation, and I hope that both (formalist) optimality theorists and functionalists will take note of the important similarities between the two approaches.
Significant differences remain between optimalty theory and competing motivations models, of course. Rather than focus on these, I would like to discuss what I perceive as a more general problem with Haspelmath's proposals which ultimately bear on the functional principles that he invokes for the universal constraints of optimality theory.
Haspelmath argues that the functional/optimality constraints are best interpreted as applying to language change, not to the static linguistic system. Haspelmath invokes a biological evolutionary model of language change, where the positive "adaptive" value of more optimal outputs leads to them being selected (i. e. produced) by speakers at a greater frequency over less optimal outputs. As Haspelmath notes, I disagree with his interpretation of the evolutionary model for language change (see Croft 1995 Croft , 1996 Croft , 2000 . I will briefly present my views here, in order to set the stage to present a further problem not discussed in Haspelmath's paper.
Clearly, one cannot adopt all of the theory of biological evolution into linguistics (or any other discipline which displays apparently evolutionary patterns). Much of evolutionary biological theory is domain-specific. This includes the mechanism for selection in biology, adaptation to one's physical environment and to other members of the species (in particular with respect to oportunities for reproduction). Although the functional principles invoked by Haspelmath are described by him as "adaptive", they are a very different sort of adaptation, and so only a general analogy to adaptation in biological selection can be made in these terms.
Also, not all parts of evolutionary biological theory necessarily hang together, and hence not all parts of the theory need be carried over. Most important of all, a generalized theory of evolutionary processes, independent of any scientific domain, must be used in applying evolutionary concepts to another domain. Hull (1988) has developed a generalized theory of selection, independent of biology, which he applies to conceptual change in science and which can also be applied to language change. Hull argues that evolution is a two-level process: (1) the creation of replicators by a process of replication, some identical to the original and some altered; (2) the interaction of interactors with their environment, in such a way as to cause replication of replicators to be differential (i. e. some replicators are replicated in a higher frequency than others; Hull 1988: 408-9). The first process gives rise to variation, and the second process is selection proper. Nothing is implied about the types of mechanisms that give rise to altered replication or to selection; these are domain-specific.
If the mechanisms of altered replication and selection are domain-specific, they need not be analogous across domains. In fact, that appears to be the case in language change. All of the empirical evidence gathered in sociolinguistics indicates that variants (altered replicates) of linguistic structures are selected for social reasons, not "functional" ones (see e. g. Labov 1994, or any textbook on sociolinguistics). That is, functional "adaptation" is not the mechanisms for selection in language change.
How is it then that there seem to be more "optimal" than "dysfunctional" linguistic systems across the world? This is possible even if functional principles are mechanisms for altered replication, that is, innovation, and not selection. If functional constraints operate to determine the frequency of innovations, and the novel variants undergo social selection, then the end result is going to be a preponderance of optimal variants in the long run: the pattern of favoring and disfavoring contexts does not reflect the forces pushing the change forward. Rather, it reflects functional effects, discourse and processing, on the choices speakers make among the alternatives available to them in the language as they know it; and the strength of these effects remains constant as the change proceeds" (Kroch 1989: 238). And in fact, this is exactly what we would expect, since functional constraints do not change over the time course of a change.
The argument in the last few paragraphs indicates that it is possible to have an evolutionary theory of language change in which functional constraints operate on inovation but do not play a role in selection. (In contrast, Haspelmath appears to adhere to an invisible hand theory like that of Keller 1990 Keller /1994 , which in evolutionary terms is a theory of drift -differential replication without interaction with the environment [Hull 1988: 443] .) In fact, there is additional evidence, besides the well-known sociolinguistic evidence, that the latter theory of language change is preferable.
Not all language changes are in the "optimal", "adaptive" direction. Andersen (1988) brings together evidence that "dysfunctional" phonological changes, such as fortition of vowels into consonants, occur in small, isolated speech communities. Such communities also tend to retain older forms, that is, the less "optimal" forms that the rest of the speech community has replaced with the newer, more "optimal" variants. Trudgill adduces additional examples and argues the the "dysfunctional" changes are likely to occur in such communities because of their close-knit social network structure (Trudgill 1989 (Trudgill ,1992 (Trudgill ,1996 . The changes we call "natural" are in fact characteristics of larger, high-contact, looseknit societies (ibid.). Trudgill warns us against assuming that "natural" language change -the "adaptive" ones -are universally "natural" (see especially Trudgill 1989). Instead, they are "natural" for only certain types of societies, for social reasons.
A model in which selection is functionally "adaptive" cannot account for the selection of "dysfunctional" variants. On the other hand, one could expect exactly this state of affairs if the mechanism for selection is social, while the mechanism for altered replication is functional (and that there is a degree of randomness in both mechanisms). In the latter model, a "dysfunctional" variant from a functional perspective -the etymologically older variant, or perhaps a rare random "dysfunctional" production -can be selected for social reasons.
